NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES FOR REHEARING, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY APPELLATE DIVISION
DIANE LOMBARDI,
Appellant,
UCN: 512018AP000056APAXWS
Appeal No.: 18-AP-56
L.T. No.: 18-CC-00473
RONALD V. HOWARTH,
Appellee.
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On appeal from Pasco County Court, Honorable Paul Firmani
Nickolas C. Ekonomides, Esq. Nickolas C. Ekonomides, P.A., for Appellant.
Edward C. Castagna, Jr., Esq. Castagna Law Firm, P.A.,
for Appellee.
ORDER DENYING AP PELLEE ’S MOTIO N FOR REHE ARING
The motion for rehearing is denied as to Appellee’s legal arguments without further comment. However, footnote 3 of Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing is correct that this Court mischaracterized paragraph 11 of his motion to dismiss the counterclaims. Accordingly, we withdraw the Court’s Opinion rendered on January 22, 2020, and issue the following opinion in its stead.
ORDER AND OPINION
The parties make several arguments in their briefs. However, our review of the record found multiple jurisdictional issues not addressed by either party. For the reasons detailed below, this Court holds that the county court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction no later than March 29, 2018. Because one of the jurisdictional problems was the amount in controversy of Appellant’s counterclaims exceeding $15,000, the county
court should have transferred the entire case to the circuit trial court. Accordingly, all orders issued by the county court in this case, including the order issuing the writ of possession, must be reversed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of the arguments of the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Appellant was the occupant of a mobile home on a parcel of land and paid money monthly to either Appellee or non-party Ronnie’s Rentals, Inc., a corporation owned in whole or in part by Appellee. Appellee filed a two-count Complaint in the county court for eviction (Count I) and damages for nonpayment of rent (Count II).1 In the Complaint, Appellee alleged that the parties’ relationship was an oral at-will tenancy and sought to evict Appellant from the residential property.
Process was served on February 2, 2018. Because that date was a Friday, the fifth day to respond was February 9, 2018. See Fla. R. Jud. Adm. 2.514(a)(1); (a)(3). On the fifth day, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Fraud upon the Court, a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action, and a four-count Counterclaim. The Motion to Dismiss for Fraud upon the Court argued that Appellee had committed fraud in his Complaint by alleging an oral at-will tenancy.
Relevant to the resolution of the appeal, one of the motions asserted that the parties had entered into a rent-to-own agreement for a term of 11 years after which Appellant would own the property outright. As a result, the motion argued, Appellant “may have some legal and equitable title, before the facts of the title can be made clear before the court.” Also relevant to the resolution of the appeal, Appellant’s four-count Counterclaim sought damages in excess of $15,000 before interest, attorney fees, and costs.
Appellant submitted all of the above in a single filing. Attached to Appellant’s filing were the following relevant documents:
A lease agreement with an illegible ending date.
A rental application stating a term of 11 years.
1 Appellee voluntarily dismissed Count II on March 29, 2018.
A Warranty Deed dated December 29, 2010 and recorded on January 5, 2011 in Pasco County records at OR 8498 PG 2773, showing a conveyance in a property interest from Ronnie’s Rentals, Inc. to Appellant and Keith Howarth (presumably Appellee’s brother). There is a legal description and a parcel number listed as 06- 26-16-0030-00000-0360 (parcel 360). The street address is listed as 6973 Edgewater Drive. (Emphasis added.)
A letter from the property appraiser’s office dated February 9, 2011 stating that the Warranty Deed gave the legal description of parcel number 06-26-16-0030-00000- 0350 (parcel 350) and not parcel 360. The letter states that parcel 350 is “presently assessed to Keith Howard and Phillip Goins and Ruth Wells, as per the Warranty Deed recorded in OR 8498 PG 2772.” The letter goes on to state that the property at parcel 360 “remains assessed to Ronnie’s Rentals, Inc.”
A Quitclaim Deed signed by Appellee and recorded on March 24, 2003. The Quitclaim Deed contains parcel 350 and parcel 360. Despite including both parcels, the Quitclaim Deed lists only one street address; an address different than the address listed in the Warranty Deed for parcel 360: 6953 Edgewater Drive. (Emphasis added.)
Appellant neither moved to determine rent nor paid rent into the court registry on or before February 9, 2018.
The county court did not issue any orders prior to March 29, 2018. On March 29, 2018, Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims. Relevant to the resolution of the appeal, Appellee made the following factual assertions and legal arguments:
The counterclaims allege damages in excess of $15,000. Therefore, they should be dismissed because they exceed the subject-matter jurisdiction limits of the county court.
As to counterclaim 2, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act counterclaim, failure to state a cause of action, arguing that there is no evidence of a written rent-to-own agreement and a conveyance of real property must be made in writing and signed in the presence of two witnesses. Section 689.01, Florida Statutes.
As to counterclaim 2, the 2011 letter from the Property Appraiser shows that Appellant was on notice for years that an interest in the property she was renting had not been conveyed to her.
As to counterclaims 3 and 4, the fraud in the inducement and specific performance counterclaims, respectively, Appellee argued that a lack of a written rent-to-own agreement should also result in these counterclaims’ dismissal.
In Paragraph 11 of his Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, Appellee wrote “Lombardi’s attempt to cobble together a contract that would meet the strict requirements of section 689.01, Florida Statutes, out of a[n] . . . at best two-year lease agreement . . .” (Emphasis added.)
A hearing on the competing motions to dismiss was held on April 20, 2018; however the hearing was not transcribed and thus not made part of the record. On May 8, 2019, the trial court issued an order denying Appellant’s motions to dismiss and granting her 20 days to file an Answer and Affirmative Defenses. The order also granted Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, dismissed Appellant’s counterclaim 1 with prejudice and the rest without prejudice, and granted her 10 days to file amended counterclaims. Appellant did not attempt to file an answer and affirmative defenses or amended counterclaims until after the Final Judgment had issued.
On June 19, 2018, Appellee filed a motion for judicial default, alleging failure to pay rent into the court registry or move to determine rent within 5 days of service of process. See § 83.60(2), Fla. Stat. (2017).
On June 29, 2018, Appellant’s counsel moved to withdraw. Consequently, it appears that between June 30, 2018 and July 17, 2018, Appellant proceeded pro se.
On July 2, 2018, the county court issued a default judgment for nonpayment of rent into the court registry. Later that day, Appellant moved pro se to stay the default judgment until she could obtain new counsel. The trial court issued a final judgment of eviction and writ of possession on July 6, 2018 but later granted Appellant’s motion to stay.
On July 17, 2018, through newly-obtained counsel, Appellant filed her “Verified Emergency Motion of [Appellant], Diane Lombardi, to Vacate Final Eviction Judgment, Dissolve Writ, Reopen Case, and Dismiss the Eviction Action, and Memorandum of Law”
(Motion to Vacate Final Judgment). The motion stated that it was brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4).
On August 2, 2018, Appellee filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion. Relevant to the resolution of this appeal, Appellee argued that Appellant was required to raise any title issues in a separate cause of action but had not done so and therefore there were no pending title issues to be resolved. He also argued that Appellant’s failure to pay rent into the court registry served as an absolute waiver of all of Appellants’ defenses other than payment of rent.
Appellant’s Motion to Vacate Final Judgment was heard on August 3, 2018. The trial court’s order denying the motion was rendered on August 14, 2018 and the stay was lifted. On September 7, 2018, Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal. The notice was timely- filed as to the order denying the Motion to Vacate Final Judgment. The parties disagree whether it was timely-filed as to the Final Judgment. However, a determination on that issue is not required to resolve this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and can be raised sua sponte by an appellate court. Strommen v. Strommen, 927 So. 2d 176, 178-79 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Synchron, Inc. v. Kogan, 757 So. 2d 564, 565 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Appellate courts review subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Solar Dynamics, Inc. v. Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, P.C., 211 So. 3d 294, 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
County Court was Divested of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
A trial court does not have the authority to act without subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is established via statute, rule, or constitutional provision. An order issued without subject-matter jurisdiction is void ab initio. Ricci v. Ventures Trust 2013-I-H-R by MCM Capital Partners, LLC, 276 So. 3d 5, 7-8 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Strommen, 927 So. 2d at 178-79. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or stipulation of the parties. Id. A lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and can be raised sua sponte by an appellate court. Id.; Kogan, 757 So. 2d at 565 n.1.
The county court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction for three reasons: First, as noted by Appellee in his own motion to dismiss before the county court, Appellant’s counterclaims alleged an amount in controversy exceeding $15,000. Second, Appellant’s February 9, 2018 filing and attachments presented the possibility of the existence of a rent-to-own agreement and a possible title issue that did not require a separate cause of action to resolve. Third, regardless of the nature of the occupancy agreement between the parties, Appellant argued and Appellee conceded the possibility that the length of the agreement exceeded one year.
Counterclaims – Amount in Controversy Exceeded $15,000
County courts have “original jurisdiction . . . of all actions at law, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit courts, in which the matter in controversy does not exceed, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney fees, if filed on or before December 31, 2019, the sum of $15,000.” § 34.01(1)(c)(1), Fla. Stat. (2017).
While county courts have “exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings relating to the right of possession of real property” where the amount in controversy does not exceed
$15,000, an exception exists “[i]n cases transferred to the circuit court pursuant to Rule 1.170(j), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.” In such a situation, “the demands of all parties shall be resolved by the circuit court.” § 34.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2017).
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.170(j) provides: “If the demand of any counterclaim or crossclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is pending, the action must be transferred immediately to the court of the same county having jurisdiction of the demand in the counterclaim or crossclaim with only such alterations in the pleadings as are essential.” Essentially, under rule 1.170(j), if a counterclaim exceeds the subject-matter jurisdiction of the county court, jurisdiction vests in, and the entire action must be transferred to, the circuit court. A-One Coin Laundry Equipment Co. v. Waterside Towers Condominium Ass’n, 561 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Columbus Mills, Inc. v. Dionne, 328 So. 2d 467, 468 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
In the case below, Appellee himself moved to dismiss Appellant’s counterclaims on the basis that they exceeded $15,000 and therefore the county court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over them. However, in addressing the proper remedy for this
jurisdictional problem, Appellee incorrectly argued that the county court was required only to dismiss the counterclaims and leave the Complaint before the county court.
Once both parties agreed with the factual assertion that the counterclaims exceeded $15,000, the county court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire case and was required to transfer the case, Complaint, counterclaims, and all, to the circuit trial court. See § 34.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2017); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.170(j); A-One Coin Laundry Equipment Co., 561 So. 2d at 592; Dionne, 328 So. 2d at 468 n.2.
Contested Title or Ownership Interest
Even if the amount in controversy of the counterclaims was less than $15,000, the parties’ pre-March 30, 2018 filings created contested issues regarding title of the real property and/or the existence of a rent-to-own agreement which divested the county court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the Complaint.
County courts have “exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings relating to the right of possession of real property . . . except that the circuit court also has jurisdiction if . . . the circuit court otherwise has jurisdiction as provided in s. 26.012. § 34.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2017). The relevant portion of section 26.012 provides that circuit courts “have exclusive jurisdiction . . . in all actions involving the title and boundaries of real property.”
§26.012(2)(g), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphases added). Additionally, circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all “actions of ejectment.” § 26.012(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017).
In the case below, in response to Appellee’s Complaint alleging that the relationship between the parties was an oral at-will tenancy, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss asserting the existence of a rent-to-own agreement. She also filed a Warranty Deed and a Quitclaim Deed showing a possible title interest in the real property. Appellee’s arguments below regarding Appellant’s claim of ownership and title interest, which were relied upon by the county court, were incorrect for two reasons.
First, Appellee argued the existence of, and therefore the merits of, Appellant’s title interest and rent-to-own agreement arguments raised by the motion and deeds. However, a county court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to make such merits determinations. See § 26.012(2)(g), Fla. Stat. (2017) (circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over real property title issues); 26.012(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017) (circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment actions); Grimm v. Huckabee, 891 So. 2d 608,
609 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (appeal from a circuit court order where the appellate court had to analyze whether a rent-to-own agreement existed and therefore whether the plaintiff’s cause of action sounded in eviction or ejectment).
Second, Appellee improperly argued that Appellant was required to make title or ownership a contested issue by filing a separate cause of action and because no such cause of action had been filed, there was no pending title or ownership issue. Contrary to that assertion, a contested title or ownership issue can be raised within a residential eviction complaint. See, e.g., Mobley v. Hunt, 722 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Toledo
v. Escamilla, 962 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Minalla v. Equinamics Corp., 954 So. 2d 645, 646-47 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
And once the issue is raised, it must be resolved before the residential landlord/tenant statute can be applied. See Frey v. Livecchi, 852 So. 2d 896, 897-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that the trial court erred in requiring the defendants to pay rent into the court registry pursuant to section 83.60(2) before holding an evidentiary hearing to determine if occupancy was under a contract for sale pursuant to section 83.42(2)).
For these reasons, even if the counterclaims’ amount in controversy did not exceed
$15,000, the county court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction over the Complaint itself once title of the residential property and the existence of a rent-to-own agreement became contested issues.
Agreement Length may have Exceeded One Year
Even if the parties’ pre-March 30, 2018 filings were insufficient to create a contested title or ownership issue, a contested issue regarding 2 the length of the occupancy agreement between the parties also divested the county court of subject- matter jurisdiction. County courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over evictions pursuant to the residential landlord/tenant statute. See § 34.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2017). However, as previously noted, circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment actions. § 26.012(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017).
A “tenant” under the residential landlord/tenant statute is defined as “any person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit under a rental agreement.” § 83.43(4), Fla. Stat. (2017).
A lease agreement that exceeds one year in length is not a “rental agreement” within the meaning of the residential landlord/tenant statute. See § 83.43(7), Fla. Stat. (2017). As a result, where the lease agreement is longer than one year, the occupant is not a tenant within the meaning of the residential landlord/tenant statute. Toledo, 962 So. 2d at 1030. In that situation, the proper cause of action to remove the occupant is ejectment, over which the circuit court and not the county court has subject-matter jurisdiction. See id.
Appellant alleged the existence of a multi-year rent-to-own agreement in her February 9, 2018 filing. She attached to that filing a rental application showing a possible rental term of 11 years. Appellee argued in his motion to dismiss that there was no multi- year rent-to-own agreement, writing that Appellant was attempting to “cobble together a contract . . . out of a one-year, or at best, two-year lease agreement” and other documents. The competing assertions in Appellant’s counterclaims and Appellee’s motion to dismiss created a contested issue regarding the length of the agreement. As a result, Appellant’s Complaint may have sounded in ejectment rather than eviction. 3
This question divested the county court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the Complaint as only the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction over questions of ejectment. See, e.g., Minalla, 954 So. 2d at 646-47 (appeal of a circuit court order addressing the contested issue of whether the parties’ contract was a mortgage or a sale with a turn-around lease as only the latter results in a landlord/tenant relationship that permits the application of section 83.60(2)); Grimm, 891 So. 2d at 609-10 (determining whether a complaint sounded in eviction or ejectment).
Remedy for Divestment of Count y Court’s S ubje c t -matter Jurisdiction
While it may be debated whether the county court was divested of jurisdiction on February 9, 2018 or March 29, 2018, the exact date is irrelevant in this particular case. The county court did not hold any hearings or issue any orders until after March 29, 2018. Because the county court had lost subject-matter jurisdiction no later than March 29, 2018, the county court never had the authority to hold any of its hearings and every order it issued was void ab initio. Accordingly, every order of the county court in this case, including the order issuing the writ of possession, are reversed. Procedurally, as a result of this Order and Opinion, the parties are now back in their respective postures as they
existed prior to the April 20, 2018 hearing on the parties’ competing motions to dismiss as the county court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hold that hearing.
What must happen on remand is determined by how the county court’s subject- matter jurisdiction was divested. Any of the three issues detailed above was sufficient, by itself, to divest the county court of subject-matter jurisdiction by March 29, 2018. While a county court usually has discretion to either dismiss or transfer the Complaint, the counterclaims’ amount in controversy issue removes that discretion. See § 34.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2017); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.170(j). On remand, the county court must transfer the entire case to the circuit trial court.
CONCLUSION
Because the county court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction for multiple reasons no later than March 29, 2018, the county court did not have jurisdiction to hold any hearings and all orders issued in the case below are reversed as void ab initio. The case and the parties are reverted back to their procedural postures as they existed prior to the April 20, 2018 hearing on the parties’ competing motions to dismiss. The case is remanded for the county court to transfer case number 18-CC-00473 to the circuit trial court.
It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED that all orders of the trial court are REVERSED and the case REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at New Port Richey, Pasco County, Florida this day of , 2020.
Original Order entered on March 10, 2020, by Circuit Judges Shawn Crane, Kimberly Sharpe-Byrd, and Kimberly Campbell.
Copies to:
Honorable Paul Firmani
Nickolas C. Ekonomides, Esq. Nickolas C. Ekonomides, P.A. 791 Bayway Boulevard
Clearwater, FL 33767
Edward C. Castagna, Jr., Esq. Castagna Law Firm, P.A. Druhill Professional Center
611 Druid Road East, Suite 717
Clearwater, FL 33756